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The German citizenship law underwent a paradigmatic amendment in 2000. One
often overlooked change of this reform was the abolishment of the domestic clause
(“Inlandsklausel”) that implied a substantial restriction to de facto dual citizenship
acceptance. Combining data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (waves
1993–2006) with original data on origin country policies on dual citizenship and
citizenship reacquisition, we analyse the impact of the abolishment of the domestic
clause on naturalization rates. We apply a difference-in-difference design to investigate
the causal impact of this element of the reform which has remained under-studied. We
do not find an impact of the abolishment of the domestic clause on naturalization rates,
neither among the general migrant population, nor among Turkish migrants who are
alleged to be targeted specifically by this reform. These results suggest that a more
restrictive approach to dual citizenship did not dissuade migrants from acquiring German
citizenship after 2000.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the last decades immigrants’ naturalization propensity has been of growing interest to
academics as well as politicians. Citizenship acquisition of immigrants is increasingly viewed as
a key element to foster immigrant integration. Studies on citizenship have traditionally identified
several individual and origin-country factors which determine the propensity to naturalize (Jasso
and Rosenzweig, 1986; Yang, 1994; Bueker, 2005; Chiswick and Miller, 2009). Research concerning
origin-country factors has looked at the relevance of institutional context, such as dual citizenship
regulations at the origin-country level (e.g., Jones-Correa, 2001) as well as general accessibility of
citizenship (Dronkers and Vink, 2012; Vink et al., 2013).
One of the most complex reforms of recent times is the reform of German citizenship law
that came into force on 1 January 2000. Now nearly two decades ago, there are contrasting
interpretations as to how and why the 2000 reform—which is generally viewed as a paradigmatic
liberalization—has affected immigrant naturalization rates. Whereas, some have observed the
surprising puzzle of Germany’s low post-reform naturalization rates (Hochman, 2011, p. 1404;
Howard, 2008, pp. 55–57; Street, 2014, p. 264) and have even concluded “that the 2000 law
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has been a disappointment in quantitative terms” (Green, 2012,
p. 182), others have concluded that especially the reduced
waiting period has increased naturalization propensity after 2000
substantially (Gathmann and Keller, 2018, p. 17).
The reform of German citizenship law in 2000 comprised of
various elements. On the one hand, the reform included a major
liberalizing element as it reduced the residency requirement from
15 to 8 years. Additionally, it facilitated dual citizenship for some
groups. At the same time, the reform included other changes that
could have negatively affected naturalization propensities. The
reform introduced the birthright principle (ius soli), which grants
children born inGermany automatic German citizenship at birth,
irrespective of the citizenship of the parents, provided that at least
one of the parents has resided in Germany for at least 7 years. If
intergenerational motives drive naturalization, the introduction
of ius soli would make it unnecessary for immigrant parent to
naturalize to ensure that their children are citizens (Street, 2014).
While the reduction of the residency requirement (Gathmann
and Keller, 2018) and the introduction of ius soli (Street, 2014)
have been empirically investigated, one element of the 2000
reform has been overlooked: the abolishment of the “domestic
clause.” This clause exempted German citizens, voluntarily
acquiring another citizenship, from the automatic loss of German
citizenship if they continued living in Germany (Hailbronner
and Farahat, 2015). This clause previously enabled migrants to
circumvent the effects of the German requirement to renounce
one’s other citizenship before naturalizing, by reapplying for their
origin country citizenship after acquiring German citizenship.
While the abolishment of the domestic clause has been observed
by legal commentators (Hailbronner and Farahat, 2015, p. 18)
and in media reports (see e.g., even recently, Middle East
Monitor, 2020), it has been overlooked in all studies we are aware
of that refer to aggregate naturalization statistics (Howard, 2008;
Green, 2012) or analyse micro-level statistics on naturalization
propensity (Hochman, 2011; Street, 2014; Gathmann and Keller,
2018)1.
We combine data from the German-Socio-Economic Panel
Study with a unique data set on the citizenship reacquisition
policies in the origin countries to investigate the impact of the
abolishment of the domestic clause on naturalization rates in
Germany between 1993 and 2006. Employing a difference-in-
difference (DiD) strategy we, contrasting to the assumption of
legal commentators, do not find an impact of the abolishment
of the domestic clause naturalization rates, neither among
the general migrant population, nor among Turkish migrants
in particular.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the next
section provides a general outline of the German naturalization
law reform of 2000. In the third section we provide a
detailed outline of the implications of the abolishment of the
domestic clause as well as an overview on existing research on
naturalization propensities in Germany. This is followed by a
description of the data sets used in the paper and the DiD
model with which we estimate the impact of the abolishment
1Studies by Diehl and Blohm (2003, p. 144) and Zimmermann et al. (2009, p. 74)
do not take into account the consequences of the 2000 reform due to data selection.
of the domestic clause on naturalization propensities. In section
Analysis, we are discussing the main results and robustness
checks and provide results for an alternative specification where
we focus on the effect for Turkish migrants. We end the paper
with conclusions in section Conclusion.
THE GERMAN CITIZENSHIP LAW REFORM
OF 2000
For a long time, Germany was seen as a paradigmatic example
of community of descent that typically was exclusive toward
resident non-nationals while being inclusive toward non-resident
co-ethnics (Brubaker, 1990; Green, 2012). For much of the
20th century the acquisition and loss of Germany citizenship
was regulated by the Nationality Law of 1913. Since 1991
naturalization was facilitated if certain conditions were met
and in 1993 this facilitation was formalized. Naturalization
requirements differed depending on the age of the person
in question. All immigrants had to renounce their previous
nationality and show no criminal record. If between 16 and 23,
immigrants were able to naturalize after residing in Germany for
at least 8 years and having attended a German school for at least
6 years. Immigrants older than 23 could naturalize after 15 years
given that they were able to earn a living.
After national elections in 1998, the Social Democrats (SPD)
and the Green party formed the so-called Red-Green coalition,
and quickly announced that one of its first legislative acts would
be a reform of the citizenship law, including a paradigmatic
introduction of ius soli in the German citizenship law (Howard,
2008). Following strong contestation of dual citizenship early
1999 (Green, 2005), the final proposal of the reform of the
Nationality Act included some moderating elements regarding
dual citizenship, which we will discuss below. Citizenship
acquisition in Germany is regulated by the Nationality Act
which came into force on 1 January 2000 (Hailbronner and
Farahat, 2015). The new Nationality Act implied several changes
regarding the conditions under which Germany citizenship
could be acquired and lost. First, the residency requirement
was reduced from 15 to 8 years for immigrants above 232.
Accordingly, the previous differentiation by age group regarding
residency requirement was abolished.
Another element of the reform was the introduction of the
birthright principle (ius soli), which meant that children of non-
naturalized immigrants would receive German citizenship at
birth if one of the parents resided in Germany for at least 8
years. Ius soli was thereby introduced as an option model. At
the age of 18, children with dual nationality had to renounce
either their German or foreign citizenship. This part of the reform
included a transition period. Parents whose children were born
2In Germany naturalization can be acquired in three ways; with authority’s
discretions (Ermesseneinbürgerung), marriage to a German national, or legal
entitlement (Anspruchseinbürgerung) (Green, 2012). The most common way
to naturalize is through legal entitlement (Worbs, 2008). Spouses or under-
aged children of Germans and naturalized immigrants can acquire German
citizenship after a shorter period of residency. Refugees face a shortened residency
requirement of 6 years.
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between 1990 and 1999 could apply for German citizenship for
their children under the birthright principle given they applied
throughout 2000. However, this transition period was not used by
many parents (Felfe and Saurer, 2014). Since 2014, the optional
model has been modified and requirements have been relaxed.
Children of immigrant parents who are born in Germany can
now keep both citizenships if they lived in Germany for more
than 8 years and acquired formal education in Germany, or
alternatively went to a German school for at least 6 years.
Regulations on dual citizenship changed with the reform
of 2000 concerning different aspects. Acceptance for dual
citizenship increased as EU citizens and Swiss citizens were
allowed to keep their EU citizenship under the condition
of reciprocity of treatment (i.e., immigrants could keep their
EU citizenship if the respective EU country also allows dual
citizenship for a German in the same situation naturalizing).
In 2007, the reciprocity of treatment condition was abolished,
and dual citizenship was generally accepted for citizens from an
EU country and Switzerland. Non-EU immigrants in principle
must renounce their citizenship after 2000. However, some
exceptions were included. Immigrants do not have to give up
their foreign citizenship if this is not possible from the origin
country, the conditions are deplorable, or the immigrant is a
recognized refugee.
Since 2000, the German Nationality Act was subject to further
changes and revisions. The Immigration Act of 2004, which
came into force on 1 January 2005, introduced integration
requirements. The residency requirement could be reduced from
8 to 7 years if the immigrant participated in an integration course
including a language course as well as basic facts on German
history and the political system. The 2007 Act, which came into
force on 1 January 2008, added the passing of a naturalization
test as an additional naturalization requirement. Additionally,
the language requirements were formalized to language level
B1. Immigrants with higher capabilities (e.g., B2) can naturalize
already after 6 years.
Figure 1 shows the absolute numbers of naturalizations in
Germany excluding ethnic Germans since 19943. Many scholars
have observed the overall decreasing number of naturalizations
after the reform of 2000 (in Figure 1: Total). Given the
major liberalization of the reforms by reducing the residency
requirement this decrease has been viewed as puzzling (Howard,
2008; Green, 2012; Street, 2014). However, the problem with
such framing is that overall trends in the changing number of
naturalizations ignore changes in the population that is eligible
to naturalize, which are affected both by growth of the number of
foreign residents as well as by the reduced residence requirement
for selected groups since 1993 and generalized from 2000
onwards (as detailed above). As can be seen from Figure 1, the
number of naturalizations increased since themid-1990s, initially
pushed especially by the acquisition of German citizenship
3Since 2000, citizenship acquisition of ethnic Germans is no longer counted as
naturalization and ethnic Germans are therefore no longer in the naturalization
statistics. Before 2000, we proxy the number of naturalizations of ethnic Germans
by excluding naturalizations via legal entitlement that are not according to par. 85
and 68 Abs.1 AuslG.
FIGURE 1 | Absolute numbers of naturalisations in Germany, 1994–2017.
Source: calculations by authors based on Destatis (2018). Numbers exclude
ethnic Germans.
by Turkish nationals (with a peak of 100,000 naturalizations
in 1999) and from 2000 onwards largely driven by the non-
Turkish immigrant population. In order to assess the effect of
changes in the citizenship law, other than changing eligibility
requirements, and net of changes in the migrant population, it
is crucial to assess the rate of naturalization relative to the eligible
foreign population in Germany. Unfortunately, administrative
statistics on naturalization rates among the eligible population
are only available since 2000 (Destatis, 2018). For this reason,
analyses of the effect of the changing citizenship law in 2000,
typically rely on survey data in order to estimate changes in
naturalization propensity at the micro-level among migrants
eligible to naturalize (e.g., Gathmann and Keller, 2018).
ABOLISHMENT OF THE DOMESTIC
CLAUSE
Despite the paradigmatic nature of the case of the 2000 German
citizenship law reform, the impact on naturalization rates in
Germany remains curiously understudied. In this paper we focus
on one particular element of the reform that has remained
under-studied so far, namely the abolishment of the so-called
“domestic clause,” which concerned the closing of a previous
legal loophole to circumvent Germany’s overall restrictive dual
citizenship policy. While this policy change has been observed
by some, predominantly, legal commentators (Hailbronner and
Farahat, p.18), especially in the context of the relevance of dual
citizenship, no studies so far have aimed to quantify the effect
of this restriction. In the next section, we introduce the context
of this policy change and formulate our theoretical expectations
based on the literature.
According to German law, the voluntary acquisition of
another citizenship implies the automatic loss of citizenship
(§ 25 StAG). Until 1 January 2000, the “domestic clause”
(Inlandsklausel) allowed German citizens residing in Germany
to acquire a foreign citizenship without losing the German
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citizenship. In practice this meant that immigrants could
naturalize in Germany, give up their foreign citizenship in order
to fulfill the renunciation requirement for German naturalization
and re-acquire this foreign citizenship at a later stage. This
practice was of particular relevance in the case of Turkish
migrants who, encouraged by their home country government,
made use of this circumvention of the German dual citizenship
restriction at large scale (Anil, 2007; Hailbronner and Farahat,
2015). After the abolishment of the domestic clause by the reform
of 2000 dual citizenship through reacquisition of the origin
citizenship was no longer possible. The abolishment of the so-
called “domestic clause” implied a substantial restriction to de
facto dual citizenship acceptance.
First, the impact of the abolishment of the domestic clause
on naturalization rates has not been investigated. This change
has been addressed in legal reports (Hailbronner and Farahat,
2015), but not in those that have analyzed naturalization rates
before and after 2000. The studies on the impact of the reduced
residency requirement (Gathmann and Keller, 2018) and the
introduction of ius soli (Street, 2014) do not explicitly account
for changing dual citizenship regulations and therefore do not
provide a comprehensive assessment of the various elements of
the reform.
Second, there are some studies that discuss the politics of the
reform, yet they refer to aggregate level statistics to formulate
claims about the individual-level effects of the citizenship
reform (Howard, 2008; Green, 2012; see also Anil, 2007 who
provides more detailed, but still aggregate-level statistics on the
naturalization practices of Turks in Germany). Other studies on
naturalization propensity in Germany provide statistical analyses
in a de-contextualized manner by not taking into account the
effect of institutional rules in either the destination country (i.e.,
citizenship policy changes in Germany) or origin country (i.e.,
dual citizenship policies) (Diehl and Blohm, 2003; Zimmermann
et al., 2009).
In the previous section, we have identified the different
institutional changes due to the reform of German citizenship
law in 2000. In order to carve out the effect of the abolishment
of the domestic clause, it is important to identify the effect of
the various changes, namely the change in residency requirement
and introduction on ius soli, on the naturalization propensity
of migrants.
Studies on citizenship have identified several individual
and origin-country factors which determine the propensity to
naturalize (Jasso and Rosenzweig, 1986; Yang, 1994; Bueker, 2005;
Chiswick and Miller, 2009). These factors matter especially in
terms of perceived benefits. The benefit of naturalizing depends
on the relative “value” of the origin country citizenship as well
as the perceived future regarding the destination country and
family situation (e.g., Yang, 1994; Helgertz and Bevelander, 2017).
In addition, scholars have increasingly looked at the relevance
of the institutional context. The institutional context is of high
importance as it shapes the naturalization process as well as
the eligibility conditions. Research on this aspect has looked at
the relevance of institutional context, such as dual citizenship
regulations at the origin-country level (e.g., Jones-Correa, 2001)
as well as general accessibility of citizenship (Dronkers and
Vink, 2012). Studies including the institutional context show
that restrictive policies in the destination country decrease
naturalization, while more liberal policies increase naturalization
(Bloemraad, 2002; Bauböck et al., 2013; Vink et al., 2013; Peters
et al., 2016).
Whether or not an immigrant is eligible to naturalize is
crucial when studying naturalization propensities as only then an
immigrant can make the decision to naturalize. The residency
requirement determines the timing of naturalization. This is
important as naturalization is a life course project (Peters and
Vink, 2016), and for citizenship acquisition to be part of the
life planning it needs to be within a foreseeable time horizon.
Thus, we expect that naturalization rates increase for all migrants
after 2000 in light of the reduced residency requirement. This
is supported by the results by Gathmann and Keller (2018) who
do find an increased likelihood to naturalize due to the reduced
residency requirement.
Migrants do not only naturalize to obtain the destination
country citizenship for themselves but also for their children
(Street, 2014). These intergenerational motives suggest that
migrant’s motivation to naturalize includes the benefits this has
for their children (Street, 2014). Hence, migrants with minor
children may be more likely to naturalize. This may also mean
that if children can automatically acquire citizenship at birth
(i.e., ius soli) migrants do not need to naturalize due to an
intergenerational motive as their children will already be citizens.
Thus, we expect that naturalization rates for migrants with
children decreases after 2000. This decreased naturalization rates
among parents has been found by Street (2014).
Naturalization propensities do not only depend on the benefits
of acquisition, such as voting rights or secured residency status
but also on the costs of acquisition. These costs may be monetary
costs of acquiring citizenship (e.g., fees in the naturalization
process) but also non-monetary costs if the origin country
citizenship cannot be maintained after naturalizing. The loss of
citizenship in the country of origin may affect the ability to work,
hold property or invest in the origin country and can lead to a
loss of rights to its public services and social benefits (Bloemraad,
2004). A general finding in the literature is that dual citizenship
influences naturalization propensity (Dronkers and Vink, 2012;
Peters et al., 2016)4. The option of dual citizenship depends on
the constellation of policies in the origin (loss provision) and the
destination country (renunciation requirement).
The domestic clause in Germany before 2000 implied that
migrants could circumvent destination country dual citizenship
restrictions by first renouncing their origin country citizenship
and, subsequently, reacquiring that citizenship. Based on the
costs of giving up the origin country citizenship this means that
those migrants should be more likely to naturalize than their
counterparts that either cannot reacquire their origin country
citizenship or would subsequently lose again their destination
country citizenship. Thus, we expect that naturalization rates
decrease after 2000.
In the context of Germany and the domestic clause, it is
known that Turkish migrants most prominently made use of
4See Helgertz and Bevelander (2017) for contrasting findings.
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the domestic clause (Hailbronner and Farahat, 2015). In German
parliamentary debates regarding the abolishment of the domestic
clause, this was regularly emphasized, and the abolishment was
referred to as “Lex Turka” (see e.g., Deutscher Bundestag, 2005,
2008). At the same time, Turkey facilitated the use of the domestic
clause by making it easy to reacquire Turkish citizenship while
living in Germany (McFadden, 2019). Therefore, the abolishment
of this legal loophole may have affected Turkish migrants in
particular (Anil, 2007). Accordingly, naturalization rates may
especially decrease for Turkish migrants after 2000.
MATERIAL AND METHODOLOGY
Data
In order to analyse the impact of the abolishment of the domestic
clause on naturalization propensities, we use information
obtained from the 1993 to 2006 waves of the GSOEP5. The
GSOEP is a longitudinal household survey, which interviews
around 30,000 respondents each year. The GSOEP is the longest
running longitudinal survey in Germany which enable the
analysis of question on migration and integration processes
(Liebau and Tucci, 2015). The survey strives to include a
representative sample of migrants. Since immigrants show lower
respondent rates than natives the GSOEP oversamples certain
groups of immigrants—such as Turkish, Greek, Spanish, Italian,
and former Yugoslavian immigrants in earlier waves (Liebau and
Tucci, 2015). The GSOEP sample has been widely used to study
questions of migration and integration (see on migration e.g.,
Diehl and Schnell, 2006; Davidov andWeick, 2011; Kóczán, 2016;
and on naturalization Von Haaren-Giebel and Sandner, 2016).
The GSOEP is suitable to study naturalization propensities as the
questionnaire, since the beginning of the survey in 1984, includes
questions about both citizenship status and country of birth.
As we are studying the effect of the abolishment of the
domestic clause, we combine the GSOEP data with data sets
on policies in the origin country. To test the effect of the
abolishment of the domestic clause, we need to identify the
group of migrants that were affected by it. This group regards
migrants who are from an origin country that allows dual
citizenship and provides reacquisition of citizenship without
residency requirement. For information on origin country dual
citizenship policies we draw on data from the MACIMIDE
Expatriate Dual Citizenship Dataset (Vink et al., 2015). The
information in this dataset indicates whether origin countries
have policies that imply the automatic loss of citizenship upon
the voluntary acquisition of another citizenship. For information
on the reacquisition of citizenship, we created a new dataset—
the Reacquisition of Citizenship Dataset—with yearly information
on the possibility of citizenship reacquisition from 1960 to 2017.
5Another data set that has been used to study questions on migration and
integration in Germany is the Microcensus which is an annual survey of 1% of the
population in Germany.While it entails a larger sample of foreigners as the GSOEP
it is not suitable for our analysis as foreign-born and naturalized individuals
can only be identified since 2005. Information on the year of migration and the
year of naturalization could be used retrospectively but most other individual
control variables cannot be recreated as this information is only available for the
survey year.
For the purpose of this study, we make use of a variable that
differentiates between citizenship laws that (1) do not provide
for the reacquisition of citizenship, (2) provide for reacquisition
but with residency requirements, or (3) provides for reacquisition
without residency requirement6.
We use the waves from 1993 as since then naturalization
became formally an entitlement of individuals who fulfill
the requirements (Hailbronner and Farahat, 2015, p. 4–5).
Restricting the analysis to waves until 2006 enables us to have a
balanced panel with 7 observation years before and from 2000.
Furthermore, the selection of these survey waves allows us to
exclude the impact of changes to the German citizenship law
after 2006, instituting new language requirements and integration
tests. The analysis focuses on first generation (i.e., foreign-born)
immigrants who arrived in Germany before 1998 as they still
have the possibility to naturalize within the observation period.
In order to focus on the explicit decision to naturalize we
restrict the analysis to immigrants who are 15 or older at the
moment of migration and exclude ethnic Germans. Immigrants
younger than 15 at the moment of migration can make use
of different eligibility requirements as they can naturalize after
having completed a minimum number of years of schooling.
Furthermore, immigrants younger than 16 cannot apply for
citizenship themselves but their parents apply in their name.
Ethnic Germans, coming from the successor states of the former
Soviet Union and from other Eastern European states are
excluded as they are exempted from the standard naturalization
requirements and are naturalized upon or shortly after arrival
in Germany7. We furthermore exclude immigrant who have
German citizenship at arrival8.
To study the impact of the abolishment of the domestic clause
on naturalization rates, we restrict the sample to migrants who
are eligible to naturalize. We define eligibility according to the
residency requirement that an individual migrant likely faces and
it lies between 3 and 15 years depending on the martial status
and year of migration. Migrants who are married to a German
citizen can naturalize after 3 years according to administrative
practice (Hailbronner and Farahat, 2015). All other migrants
face a residency requirement of 8–15 years which is determined
based on their year of migration. Migrants who arrived after
2000, become eligible to naturalize after 8 years of residency.
Migrants who migrated until 1985 become eligible after 15 years
of residency. Migrants who arrived between 1986 and 1999
originally faced the 15 years residency requirement but given that
this changes to 8 years in 2000 it was shortened to 9–14 years
depending on the year of migration.
We furthermore restrict the sample to migrants who are
from countries that do not automatically lose their citizenship
upon naturalization in Germany but who can renounce it.
The rationale for this restriction is that only migrants from
6The dataset is publicly available at: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/L3DPE4. The
information to construct this dataset is collected from GLOBALCIT (2017).
7We identify ethnic Germans by their legal status upon arrival (being ethnic
German) or if the country is one of the successor states of the Soviet Union or
another Eastern European state and they naturalize within 2 years after arrival.
8Due to small numbers of observations and data availability we exclude
immigrants who report to be stateless or of Palestinian origin.
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countries with those dual citizenship provisions were, given
the citizenship renunciation regulations in the origin country,
potentially able to make use of the domestic clause. In other
words, we ensure comparability between control and treatment
group by restricting our sample to migrants from those origin
countries with the same dual citizenship provisions. This group
represents the majority of immigrants in Germany and therefore
83% of immigrants in our sample9.
These restrictions result in a sample of 12,147 person-year
observations. As pointed out above, the GSOEP is a survey
that strives to include a representative sample of migrants. The
descriptive statistics of our final sample support this notion. In
our sample, 39% of migrants are from Turkey, 20% from Italy
and 13% from Greece. Given the sample comprises of 83% of the
migrant population, these percentages are somewhat higher but
corresponding with official numbers onmigrant populations. For
example, in 2000, the German statistical office reported that 34%
of (non-naturalized) migrants in Germany were from Turkey,
10% from Italy, and 6% from Greece (Destatis, 2003).
Estimation Strategy
We employ a difference-in-difference framework following
Yasenov et al. (2019) to identify the effect of the abolishment of
the domestic clause. We therefore compare naturalization rates
for immigrants who were affected by the abolishment of the
domestic clause (treatment) and those who were not (control)
before and after 2000.
Our estimation strategy can be formalized as follows:
Yicft = ∝ +β1Treatmenticft + β2Posticft + β3Treatmenticft
∗ Post2000t + β4Xicft + β5Oct + γt + δf + εicft
Where Yicft indicates where an immigrant i from origin country c
residing in federal state f is naturalized in year t. Treatmenticft
indicates the treatment group and Posticft indicates the years
2000 and later. Xicft comprises individual controls (gender,
age, age-squared, years since migration, ysm-squared, years of
education, marital status, citizenship spouse, child below 18,
working, household income) and Oct origin country controls
(EU). Furthermore, the equation includes year fixed effects (γt)
to account for year-specific effects (e.g., changes in political or
economic situation) as well as federal state fixed effects (δf ). ∝
denotes the intercept and εicft the error term
10. We account for
potential heteroskedasticity by calculating robust standard errors
clustered at the individual level.
β3 is our difference-in-difference estimator of interest that
identifies the average difference in the naturalization rate between
those affected by the abolishment of the domestic clause
(treatment group) and those who were not (control group) after
controlling for several individual and origin country controls.
In order to identify our treatment and control group and thus
who were and who were not affected by the abolishment of the
9The context according to which we identify which migrants do not automatically
lose their citizenship upon naturalization in Germany, but who can renounce it, is
laid out in section A1 in the Supplementary Material.
10The theoretical motivation and operationalization of the control variables is laid
out in section A2 of the Supplementary Material.
FIGURE 2 | Identification of the effect of the abolishment of the domestic
clause in German citizenship law.
domestic clause, we make use of the origin country citizenship
policies and define the groups accordingly:
Treatment group: Migrants who can reacquire their origin
citizenship without residing in the origin country.
Control group: Migrants who cannot reacquire their origin
citizenship without residing in the origin country.
The treatment identification is visually represented in Figure 2.
Amongst migrants who are required to renounce their other
citizenship, we identify whether this person would be able
to reacquire this citizenship, after having renounced it, while
residing in Germany. If it is possible to reacquire citizenship in
the origin country without residency requirement, the migrant
is in the treatment group. Otherwise, he or she is in the
control group.
When analyzing the treatment effect of the domestic clause
abolishment, it is important to take into account simultaneous
changes that were part of the 2000 reform. As discussed in
section The German Citizenship Law Reform of 2000, the reform
of 2000 not only included the abolishment of the domestic
clause but simultaneously reduced the residency requirement,
introduced ius soli and facilitated dual citizenship for EU citizens
under the condition of reciprocity of treatment. The changing
residency requirement led, on the one hand to a change in the
moment of eligibility but may also have affected naturalization
propensities in general. Given that we restrict our analysis to
eligible migrants and there are no differences in the composition
between control and treatment group as well as before and
after 2000 (see Supplementary Table 1), the potentially positive
impact of the increased residency requirement is not affecting
the results for the difference-in-difference estimator but would
be reflected in general increased naturalization propensities after
2000. The ius soli introduction, which may reduce naturalization
propensity of parents, does not affect our difference-in-difference
estimator as the share of parents in both treatment and
control group are very similar. With the reform in 2000, EU
citizens and Swiss citizens were exempted from the renunciation
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FIGURE 3 | The unadjusted cumulative naturalization rate between 1993 and 2006 (A), Differences in naturalization rates between Treatment and control group over
time. Dots denote point estimates and vertical lines correspond to 95% CI (B).
requirement under the condition of reciprocity of treatment (i.e.,
immigrants could keep their EU citizenship if the respective
EU country also allows dual citizenship for a German in
the same situation naturalization)11. As a result, migrants
who could keep their EU citizenship under the condition of
reciprocity of treatment were not affected by the abolishment
of the domestic clause. To make sure that our analysis is
not biased by the inclusion of migrants from this group, we
exclude migrants from these countries from the analysis in a
robustness check12.
ANALYSIS
Abolishment of the Domestic Clause
Figure 3A shows the unadjusted cumulative naturalization rates
for our sample between 1993 to 2006. This naturalization rate
refers to the number of migrants who are German citizens
relative to the migrant residents in Germany who are eligible
to naturalize13.
We observe continuous increasing naturalization rates within
our observation window which suggests a positive effect of the
formalization of the naturalization facilitation in 1993 as well as
an overall positive impact of the German citizenship law reform
of 2000. This suggests that there is an overall effect of the reform,
but we do not observe an indication that there may be differences
11In 2007, the reciprocity of treatment condition was abolished and
dual citizenship was generally accepted for citizens from an EU country
and Switzerland.
12Origin countries where migrants were able to be dual citizens based on
the regulations regarding EU citizenship under the condition of reciprocity of
treatment are states without a generalized requirement for naturalizing persons to
renounce their previous citizenship. This applies for (1) Belgium, France, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Switzerland, and United Kingdom since 2000; (2) Sweden
since 2001; (3) Finland since 2003, and (4) Cyprus, Hungary, Malta and Slovakia
as new EU member states since 2004 (Vink and De Groot, 2016).
13Note that this naturalization rate cannot be directly compared to naturalization
rates officially reported by statistical offices (such as DESTATIS and Eurostat) as
these naturalization rates are calculated as the share of people acquiring citizenship
in a given year relative to the foreign non-naturalization migrant population in
that year.
between control and treatment group. However, this figure is
based on the raw data and in order to test for the effect of
the abolishment of the domestic clause, we need to control for
individual characteristics and compositional changes over time,
across origin regions, and federal states within Germany.
The underlying identification assumption of the difference-
in-difference design employed here is that, in absence of the
abolishment of the domestic clause in 2000, naturalizations
across our treatment and control groups would have followed
parallel trends. Figure 3B provides evidence that the parallel
trend assumption holds for our analysis. The figure presents the
interaction terms of the treatment group and year indicators14.
In order for the parallel trend assumption to hold, there should
be no statistically significant difference in naturalization rates
between treatment and control group before the reform of 2000.
As Figure 3 shows, this is the case for our sample. However,
also in the years after 2000, there is no statistically significant
difference between treatment and control group indicating that
the abolishment of the domestic clause may have not impacted
the naturalization behavior of the treatment group.
Table 1 shows the difference-in-difference estimate of the
effect of the abolishment of the domestic clause for four
separate observation windows around 2000. We shorten the
observation windows stepwise from 1993–2006 to 1996–2003 to
do a sensitivity test of our analysis. The insignificant results of the
difference-in-difference estimator in Table 1 indicate that there
has been no general effect on immigrant naturalization rates of
the abolishment of the domestic clause for the treatment group15.
Robustness Checks
In our analyses, the control group consists of migrants who can
reacquire their origin country citizenship without residing in the
14The underlying regression analysis controls for gender, age, age-squared, ysm,
ysm-squared, years of education, married, married to German citizen, child below
18, working, household income, EU, year FE, federal state FE, region of origin FE.
Standard errors are clustered by individuals (in parentheses).
15Section A4 in the Supplementary Materials provides the full
Supplementary Table 2 as well as a discussion of the results for the control
variables.
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TABLE 1 | The impact of the abolishment of the domestic clause in 2000 on
naturalization rates.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1993–2006 1994–2005 1995–2004 1996–2003
Difference- 0.0235 0.0242 0.0230 0.0171
in-differences (0.0156) (0.0152) (0.0147) (0.0140)
N 12,147 10,453 8,732 6,972
For all coefficients, p > 0.05.
The outcome variables indicate whether someone is a German citizen. Results include
controls for gender, age, age-squared, ysm, ysm-squared, years of education, married,
married to German citizen, child below 18, working, household income, EU, year FE,
federal state FE, region of origin FE. Standard errors are clustered by individuals
(in parentheses).
TABLE 2 | The impact of the abolishment of the domestic clause in 2000 on
naturalization rates, excluding EU citizens that can be dual citizens after 2000
based on reciprocity.
(1) (2) (3) (4)











N 7,599 6,550 5,482 4,371
For all coefficients, p > 0.05.
The outcome variables indicate whether someone is a German citizen. Results include
controls for gender, age, age-squared, ysm, ysm-squared, years of education, married,
married to German citizen, child below 18, working, household income, EU, year FE,
federal state FE, region of origin FE. Standard errors are clustered by individuals
(in parentheses).
origin country. Thus, it consists of migrants who were affected
by the abolishment of the domestic clause as, before 2000, they
could be dual citizens, and afterwards not anymore. For migrants
in the control group it was not possible to be dual citizens in the
entire observation period. As outlined in section The German
Citizenship Law Reform of 2000, the reform of 2000 included
increased acceptance for dual citizenship for EU citizens and
Swiss citizens under the condition of reciprocity of treatment.
Accordingly, migrants from EU countries where German
immigrants could keep their citizenship, were able to be dual
citizens after 2000. As this may cancel out the effect of the
abolishment of the domestic clause, we exclude those countries
from our analysis as a robustness check. The excluded countries
are therefore: Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal,
Switzerland, UK, Sweden, Finland, Cyprus, Malta, and Slovakia.
This sample is de facto a non-EU sample. In the widest window
(column 1), 145 EU migrants are included who are from
Romania, Poland, Hungary and Slovenia.
Table 2 shows the results for the difference-in-difference
estimator for the restricted sample. Excluding migrants from our
sample that can be dual citizens after 2000, does not change the
results for the difference-in-difference estimator. The coefficient
remains insignificant suggesting that the abolishment of the
domestic clause did not affect naturalization rates among the
treatment group.
Lex Turka: The Effect for Turkish Migrants
Previous results indicate that there is no generalizable effect
of the abolishment of the domestic clause. Given that Turkish
migrants, encouraged by their home country government, made
use of this circumvention of the German dual citizenship
restriction at large scale (Anil, 2007; Hailbronner and Farahat,
2015), we want to see whether, instead of a generalizable effect,
we find a particular effect among migrants from Turkey. We
therefore adjust the difference-in-difference set-up comparing
naturalization behavior of migrants from Turkey (treated) to
migrants from other origin countries (control).
Figure 4A shows the unadjusted naturalization rates for
Turkish and othermigrants between 1993 to 2006. As in Figure 3,
we observe increasing naturalization rates for both groups.
However, the growth rate of naturalization among Turkish
migrants slows down after 2000. Figure 4B shows that also
for this operationalization of the difference-in-difference design
the parallel trend assumption holds, meaning that there is no
significant difference between treatment and control group prior
to 2000.
Table 3 shows the results for the difference-in-difference
estimator for Turkishmigrants. The insignificant coefficient in all
four observation windows suggests that there is no specific “Lex
Turka” effect for Turkish migrants. Thus, the abolishment of the
domestic clause did not cause decreased naturalizations among
Turkish migrants.
Hence we do not find an impact of the abolishment
of the domestic clause on naturalization rates, neither
among the general migrant population, nor among Turkish
migrants in particular. This result is robust to samples
excluding migrants who can be dual citizens based on
reciprocity (Supplementary Table 3) and when comparing
Turkish migrants to other migrants who were initially in
the control group, thus excluding other migrants that could
have been affected by the abolishment of the domestic clause
(Supplementary Table 4).
How to interpret these findings? Does this mean that the pre-
2000 relevance of the domestic clause has been overstated? Or,
by contrast, that the possibility to circumvent dual citizenship
restrictions within the context of the law of the destination
country may facilitate naturalization where origin country
legislation facilitates this, but once this option is off the table
migrants make a new calculation. Unfortunately, our data do
not allow to tease out what drives this null finding and existing
research on the Turkish case points to contrasting explanations.
One the one hand, qualitative evidence from Anil (2007)
suggests that dual citizenship was not the predominant issue
in the naturalization decision of Turkish migrants after “the
pink card system introduced by the Turkish government in 1995
removed some of the disincentives for Turkish nationals to apply
for German citizenship.” (Anil, 2007, p. 1372)16. Others, however,
question the relevance of the pink card and doubt it removed the
interests of Turkish migrants to retain their Turkish citizenship:
16The pink card system was introduced by the Turkish government in 1995 which
enables former Turkish citizens to keep all their rights in Turkey (except the right
to vote, run for public office, and work in government jobs) (Anil, 2007).
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FIGURE 4 | The unadjusted naturalization rate between 1993 and 2006 for Turkish vs. other migrants (A), Differences in naturalization rates between Turkish migrants
(treatment group) and other (control group) over time. Dots denote point estimates and vertical lines correspond to 95% CI (B).
TABLE 3 | The impact of the abolishment of the domestic clause in 2000 for
Turkish migrants.
(1) (2) (3) (4)











N 12,147 10,453 8,732 6,972
For all coefficients, p > 0.05.
The outcome variables indicate whether someone is a German citizen. Results include
controls for gender, age, age-squared, ysm, ysm-squared, years of education, married,
married to German citizen, child below 18, working, household income, EU, year FE,
federal state FE. Standard errors are clustered by individuals (in parentheses).
In practice, the pink/blue card has not been as helpful as
expected. Users complain that the Turkish bureaucracy was not
instructed about the existence of this privileged status and so the
promised advantages never materialized. In addition, this status
does not protect those who might own or inherit property in
military security areas, ownership remains restricted to Turkish
citizens. Turks have also expressed a lack of trust in the Turkish
government to continue to offer the pink/blue card. For these
and other reasons, Turks who naturalized in Germany will have
preferred their own particular workaround: Renunciation of
Turkish citizenship, then naturalization in Germany, followed by
reacquisition of Turkish citizenship and preservation of German
citizenship due to the domestic exemption (McFadden, 2019,
p. 78).
On the other hand, the relevance of the abolishment of the
domestic clause in restricting dual citizenship is supported by
a sharp decline in the number of Turks who first renounce
and subsequently reacquired the Turkish citizenship from 2002
onwards. Whereas, in 2000 and 2001 on average 20,000 people
reacquired Turkish citizenship per year (with a peak of 27,000
in 2001), by 2003 and 2004 the number of reacquisitions
of Turkish citizenship had diminished to around 2,500 per
year (Kadirbeyoglu, 2012, p. 15, Table 1). These numbers
correspond with the ∼48,000 Turks who have lost their German
citizenship by reacquiring Turkish citizenship after 1 January
2000 (McFadden, 2019, p. 81). Such observations underline
the relevance of dual citizenship for Turks in Germany, even
when the abolishment of the domestic clause did not lower
naturalization rates.
CONCLUSION
Germany has experienced one of the most complex reforms
of citizenship law in recent time with the reform of its
Nationality Act in 2000. While other aspects of the reform—
such as the reduced residency requirement or the introduction
of ius soli—have been empirically investigated, one element
has been overlooked: the abolishment of the domestic clause
(“Inlandsklausel”). This paper we set out to study the impact of
the abolishment of the domestic clause on naturalization rates.
By doing so we aim to fill a gap between legal reports that have
addressed the abolishment of the domestic clause and empirical
studies on the reform of 2000 that focus on other changes.
Dual citizenship plays an important role in the naturalization
decision and its option depends on the constellation of policies
in the origin and destination country. The abolishment of the
domestic clause implied a substantial restriction to de facto
dual citizenship acceptance. The domestic clause in Germany
before 2000 implied that migrants could be dual citizens by first
renouncing their origin country citizenship and, subsequently,
reacquire that citizenship. Thus, the abolishment may lead to a
decrease in naturalization rates for migrants who, based on the
origin country policies, are affected by this change. As Turkish
migrants most prominently made use of the domestic clause, they
may have been affected in particular.
Combining GSOEP data with data on dual citizenship and
citizenship reacquisition origin country policies, we are able to
study the impact of the abolishment of the domestic clause on
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naturalization rates of first-generation immigrants in Germany
in a longitudinal manner. In this way, we follow recent studies
on naturalization propensities (see e.g., Peters et al., 2016 for the
Netherlands; and Helgertz and Bevelander, 2017 for Sweden),
which aim to overcome shortcomings of existing cross-sectional
analyses in order to identify the effect of changing institutional
conditions in the destination country. In order to identify the
causal impact of the abolishment of the domestic clause we
employ a difference-in-difference design where we compare
naturalization propensities of those migrants affected by the
abolishment of the domestic clause (treatment group) to those
who were not (control group).
We do not find an impact of the abolishment of the domestic
clause on naturalization rates, neither among the general migrant
population, nor among Turkish migrants in particular. We
conclude that the abolishment of the domestic clause may have
implied the closing of a backdoor to dual citizenship, by imposing
a potentially severe legal consequence on the reacquisition of
the citizenship of the origin country after having renounced this
during the naturalization procedure, but that this apparently did
not dissuade immigrants from acquiring German citizenship.
To our knowledge, we are the first to quantify the effect of
this element of the 2000 citizenship law. Since, unfortunately,
our data do not allow us to further probe the considerations
of migrants in Germany, we invite scholars to explore the
mechanisms behind these results. While there are some
contrasting findings, evidence from secondary sources on balance
suggest that even when the abolishment of the domestic clause
did not lower naturalization rates, this does not rule out the
relevance of dual citizenship for migrants in Germany.
Looking at the reform of German citizenship law in 2000,
while previous research found an impact of the reduced residency
requirement and the introduction of ius soli, our results indicate
that a more restrictive approach to dual citizenship did not
dissuade migrants from acquiring German citizenship after 2000.
We thus strongly support the claim by Bloemraad (2018) that
“attention to law and timing is important” when studying
immigrant naturalization. States have an incentive to increase the
share of naturalized immigrants, as a high share of non-nationals
is a question of democratic inclusion. This is of particular
relevance in Germany which shows the highest share of non-
nationals (Green, 2005). The non-national population amounted
to 10.6 million in 2017, of whom almost half lived in Germany
for more than 15 years (Destatis, 2018). While naturalization
propensity has been studied widely in other countries, research
on the determinants of immigrant naturalization in Germany is
still more limited than one might have expected.
Analyzing the impact of the abolishment of the domestic
clause as part of the 2000 reform in Germany, has in our view,
implications beyond the German case. Our paper demonstrates
that it is crucial to analyse the role of dual citizenship as a
constellation of origin and destination country policies.
The difference-in-difference design employed in our paper
provides a robust approach to test the impact of a particular
policy change, also within the context of a more complex reform
including several changes as is the case with the citizenship law
reform in Germany in 2000. This approach can be applied in
future studies on naturalization policies in German, such as the
dual citizenship liberalisations for EU citizens, or other countries.
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